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The Visegrád Group as a Vehicle for Promoting 
National Interests in the European Union: The 
Case of the Czech Republic 1
MAREK NEUMAN
Abstract: This contribution asks whether sub -regional integration projects such as 
the Visegrád Group may be understood as mechanisms for pursuing one Group mem-
ber’s national interests while it stands at the European Union’s helm. I assess this ques-
tion based on the case of the ﬁ rst Visegrád Group member to assume the EU Council 
presidency: the Czech Republic. Examining three speciﬁ c policy areas – the reinvention 
of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood policy; the strengthening of EU energy security; and 
the incorporation of a stronger human rights and external democratisation approach 
into EU foreign policy – this case study presents a mixed picture. It conﬁ rms the potential 
of the Visegrád Group to be a vehicle for furthering the national preferences of one 
Group member while it holds the rotating EU Council presidency. Whether or not this 
potential is fully realised will depend primarily on the degree to which the interests of 
the four Visegrád countries converge.
Keywords: European Union, Council rotating presidency, Visegrád Group, the 
Czech Republic, agenda- setting, Eastern Partnership, energy security, human 
rights, democracy promotion
Introduction
When in 1991, three countries – Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland – formed 
an informal alliance designed to foster their integration into NATO and EU 
structures, very few analysts could foresee that twenty -fi ve years later, the 
1 The author would like to thank prof. Lyubov Shishelina and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable 
feedback.
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Visegrád Group (V4) would still be around. While the V4’s initial raison d’être 
was achieved with the accession of its – by then four – members to NATO in 
1999 (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and 2004 (Slovakia) and to 
the European Union in 2004 (all four countries), the four states decided to 
cooperate on issues relevant to all of them by exerting infl uence jointly from 
within the ranks of NATO and the EU (Dangerfi eld 2008). In the case of the 
European Union in particular, the V4’s coalition potential has frequently been 
emphasised since Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw regard each other 
as natural partners on many topics and believe in pursuing certain policies 
together (Falkowski 2003; Gyárfášová 2003). While these countries are clearly 
far from being homogeneous and a coordinated approach is barred on a number 
of issues, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have been highlighted as the areas with the 
greatest potential for coordination vis -à-vis the European Union.2
Th is article assesses whether the Visegrád Group has indeed capitalised on 
its potential as a coalition within the realm of EU foreign policy -making. Rather 
than focusing solely on the negotiation stage of EU foreign policy -making, 
however it asks whether the V4 may also serve as a vehicle for promoting the na-
tional interests of the V4 member that holds the rotating EU Council presidency. 
Traditionally, the country at the EU’s helm has been expected to refrain from 
advancing its national interests during its six -month long mandate; instead, it 
should act as an honest broker among the other member states, observing the 
norms of impartiality, neutrality and effi  ciency (de Bassompierre 1988; Hayes-
-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Schout 1998). More recent accounts of the rotat-
ing Council presidency suggest, however, that the presiding country may fi nd 
numerous ways to alter the EU’s political agenda by way of its agenda -setting, 
agenda -structuring and agenda -excluding powers (Elgström 2006; Princen 2007; 
Schalk et al 2007; Tallberg 2003). Th is article aligns itself with this more recent 
understanding of the rotating Council presidency, adopting Tallberg’s (2003) 
argument that the presiding member state is a strategic actor “seeking to satisfy 
national preferences within the confi nes of [its] formally delegate role” (p. 5). 
Th e question that, thus, arises is whether regional integration eff orts such as 
the Visegrád Group can (at least partially) override the formal requirement of 
diminished agency of the member state that holds the rotating presidency.
Th e fi rst V4 member state to hold the Council presidency was the Czech Re-
public, which performed this role in the fi rst half of 2009. It is, thus, the Czech 
state that forms the focus of this study. To answer the question of whether – and 
how – the Czech Republic made use of the V4 to further its own national foreign 
2 “Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Po-
land and the Slovak Republic on the Cooperation of the Visegrád Group Countries aft er their Accession 
to the European Union,” available at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad -declarations/
visegrad -declaration-110412-1 (accessed 12 November 2016)
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policy preferences, this contribution proceeds as follows3: after briefl y discuss-
ing the priorities of the Czech presidency, it turns to three empirical areas and 
assesses whether the V4 served as a vehicle for installing Prague’s preferences 
at supranational EU level. Moreover, it explores whether the Czech Republic 
subsequently tapped into the V4’s coalition potential when negotiating specifi c 
policies in Brussels. Th is research article adopts the methodology of a qualitative 
case study. In this regard, each area of inquiry is structured so as to determine 
the relationship between the Czech Republic and the other V4 countries both 
before the Czech Republic’s Council presidency and during the presidency itself. 
To improve analytical clarity, each inquiry also has a similar structure: it fi rst 
examines the rationale behind the forming of a (national) preference vis -à-vis 
the V4 and then addresses the promotion of that preference (possibly in con-
junction with the V4) before concluding with a brief overview of the Brussels-
-based negotiations (by, with or without the V4). To pursue this methodology, 
I traced the relevant processes out in detail. Th is work was enabled by both 
primary and secondary literature research and supported by the conducting 
of some thirty (30) semi -structured interviews. Th e interviewees were drawn 
predominantly from a pool of Czech policy -makers based in Prague or in EU 
institutions in Brussels. To remedy any possible bias associated with interview-
ing policy -makers from one member state only, I also conducted interviews with 
policy offi  cers from other member states, most of whom were located in Brus-
sels. Aside from these fi rst -hand participants in foreign policy -making within 
EU institutions, several interviewees were representatives of the civil society or 
academic sectors either in the Czech Republic or other EU member states. To 
preserve anonymity where required, the interviewees are identifi ed in this study 
by way of letters (e.g. A, B, etc.). Ultimately, this comprehensive approach allows 
me to answer the main research question, i.e. whether the Visegrád Group may 
be understood as a mechanism for pursuing national preferences while one V4 
state holds the rotating EU Council presidency.4
The Czech Republic’s Council Presidency
Prague started to prepare for its Council presidency in 2007, that is, some 
one -and -a-half years before assuming the EU helm on 1 January 2009. Th is 
preparation was not limited to the strengthening of bureaucratic capacities and 
consisted largely of the formulating of a coherent work programme that would 
3 For a more detailed analysis of the Czech Republic’s integration eff orts in Central Europe in general and 
within the Visegrád Group in particular, please refer to Waisová (2011).
4 While at ﬁ rst sight this question may appear less relevant in the post -Lisbon era given the introduction 
of a permanent president of the Foreign Aff airs Council (High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy), the complex nature of EU foreign policy -making leaves much 
room for input from the rotating Council presidency. In particular, the rotating president still presides 
over all of the working groups of the Council of Ministers, including COREPER I and II and COPS.
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defi ne the Czech Council presidency. Th e outcome of this all -encompassing do-
mestic deliberation process was a programme whose theme, “Europe without 
Barriers” outlined the presidency’s three main priorities: the economy, energy 
and the European Union’s role in the world.5 In economic terms, the Czech 
Republic aspired to promote a free market economy and steer against the protec-
tionist measures that could prove very popular with some individual EU member 
states at a time when the EU fi nancial crisis was in full swing. From an energy 
perspective, Prague sought to strengthen the EU’s energy security, an issue it 
took to be increasingly pressing given the 2006 Russia–Ukraine energy crisis. 
Regarding the third priority – the EU’s position in the world – the Czechs aimed 
to tap into their own transition experience and promote transition processes 
in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood in the east.
Most of this Czech presidency preparation period coincided with the coun-
try’s occupancy of the Visegrád Group’s rotating presidency. Standing at the V4 
helm in the period between June 2007 and June 2008, the Czech Republic, thus, 
had the opportunity to test the responsiveness of its closest partners when it 
came to the Czech EU Council presidency’s priorities. It soon became clear that 
the four V4 countries had established common ground on the topics highlighted 
by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Aff airs (MFA) along with the importance of 
promoting democracy and human rights in the EU’s immediate vicinity.6 Th is 
last point, while not specifi cally mentioned in the Czech Republic’s EU Council 
work programme, was nonetheless central to Prague’s foreign policy. In fact, 
human rights promotion and external democratisation may at fi rst glance seem 
an odd concern for the Czech state given the constraining eff ects that frequent 
references to human rights and democracy abuses may have on the fulfi lment 
of other Czech foreign policy goals. Nevertheless, for Prague, this issue re-
mained paramount. According to Gabriela Dlouhá, the former director of the 
MFA’s Department of Human Rights and Transformation Policies, the emphasis 
that Czech foreign policy put on these concepts was not only normative but also 
instrumental to all of the country’s foreign policy interests.7 Th e Czech Republic 
promoted human rights, she notes, not because “we are incorrigible idealists or 
battered dreamers, but because these are a part of the world’s legal structure”8 
and, as such, represent the very foundations of prosperity.
Th ese three foreign policy issues – the reinvention of the European Un-
ion’s policy on the East European neighbourhood; the strengthening of EU 
energy security; and the incorporation of a stronger human rights and external 
5 “Work Programme of the Czech Presidency: Europe without Barriers,” available at http://www.eu2009.
cz/assets/news -and -documents/news/cz -pres_programme_en.pdf (accessed 20 November 2016)
6 “Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group (June 2007–June 2008),” available at http://www.visegradgroup.
eu/documents/presidency -programs/2007-2008-czech-110412 (accessed 18 November 2016)
7 “Interview B,” (Prague: Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, 2010)
8 “Interview B,” (Prague: Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, 2010)
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democratisation dimension into EU foreign policy – take centre stage for the 
remainder of this study. While Prague evidently agreed with its V4 partners 
about the need to promote these goals at supranational level, it remains to be 
seen whether the Visegrád Group served as a vehicle for promoting these pref-
erences and advancing them during the policy negotiations. Th e implication 
here is that relying on a regional integration framework within the European 
Union might enable a presidency -holding country to bypass the rather strin-
gent rules associated with the rotating Council presidency, and in particular, 
the requirement that the president act as an honest and neutral broker. Th e 
Czech Republic arguably took the fi rst step towards such an outcome in 2007 
when it pleaded for stronger communication among the V4 actors in Brussels 
in order to coordinate positions on “virtually all important European issues” 
(Kořan 2010: 117). Yet, while this may be seen as proof that Prague wanted to 
ensure that the Visegrád Group was active when it came to take the EU’s helm, 
it remains unclear whether it succeeded in this regard, i.e. whether the Czech 
Republic’s national preferences were – ultimately – pursued in the EU while, 
at the same time, it acted as an honest broker among the other member states. 
It is to these questions that I now want to turn.
The Visegrád Group’s Role in Furthering the Czech 
Republic’s Interests
Reinventing the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood Policy
Th e Czech Republic has long seen the 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy, 
which groups together countries at the Southern (Mediterranean) and Eastern 
European borders, as an ineffi  cient tool for comprehensively structuring the 
EU’s relationships, including especially the ties with Eastern European coun-
tries (Střítecký 2008). Consequently, it came as no surprise that when Prague 
was presented with the opportunity to outline its foreign policy priorities in 
the lead -up to its EU Council presidency, a new approach to Eastern Europe 
fi gured prominently on its agenda. Th e Visegrád Group was instrumental in 
the success of these Czech endeavours, assisting both in the formulating of the 
new approach and its promotion in Brussels. In terms of formulating the Czech 
Republic’s objectives, the Prague Security Studies Institute joined with multiple 
think -tanks from the other V4 countries to launch the project “Strengthening 
the Central European Contribution to the Eastern Dimension of EU’s CFSP.” 
Spanning a three -year period (2006–2008), this project was intended to:
 
creat[e] a platform for think -tanks, NGOs and policymakers of Visegrad coun-
tries […] in order to bring new impulses to public and expert debates concern-
ing the Eastern dimension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
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to increase and sustain their role in shaping the political agenda of the European 
Council, European Commission, [and] European Parliament (Schneider 2008, 
emphasis added).
More specifi c ideas about how to facilitate a closer relationship with the 
EU’s eastern neighbours were presented in several policy briefs and during 
three high -level policy conferences and biannual seminars. Along with a large 
number of more analytical documents about the East European neighbourhood 
compiled by third sector think -tanks and non -governmental organisations, the 
output of this consortium was circulated among MFA civil servants. As such, it 
served to support the Ministry’s eff orts to establish a national preference for 
the EU’s approach to its eastern neighbours, which could then be advanced in 
Brussels for further negotiations.
Once the Czech MFA had prepared its non -paper “ENP and Eastern Neigh-
bourhood – Time to Act: Food for Th ought,” it turned again to the Visegrád 
Group for support. In this way, Prague made use of its V4 presidency to call for 
a more cohesive approach to Eastern Europe:
[t]he goal of the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group was to preserve the 
continuity and tradition of V4 cooperation while opening it up to new effi  cient 
approaches designed to promote mutual understanding, not only among V4 
countries but also between EU Member States and the countries in transition 
neighbouring on the V4 region, especially the countries of Eastern Europe.9
By appealing fi rst to the V4, Prague achieved three goals. First, it positioned itself 
strategically as the initiator of a new EU policy on Eastern Europe – a position 
generally ascribed to Poland (Kratochvíl 2007: 191–193). Second, it involved all 
of the other V4 partners – countries generally interested in Eastern Europe – in 
the issue, thereby improving the standing of this multilateral grouping within 
the EU institutional system. Th ird, through the V4’s consultations with the three 
Baltic countries and other important partners such as Germany and Austria, sup-
port was garnered for Prague’s proposal long before it was offi  cially presented 
to the EU. Consequently, during a meeting of Visegrád state foreign ministers in 
April 2008, Prague received the backing of the V4 states to pursue the strategy 
at EU level: “Th e Visegrad Group is ready to contribute to the ongoing discus-
sion and eff ort to strengthen the ENP, which refl ects the Group’s joint interest 
in further enhancement of EU relations with the East European countries.”10
9 “Activities of the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group (June 2007 – June 2008),” available at http://
www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/annual -reports/2007-2008-czech-110412 (accessed 22 November 
2016) (emphasis added)
10 “Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Aff airs of the Visegrad Group Countries,” available at http://
www.visegradgroup.eu/2008/joint -statement -of -the (accessed 22 November 2016)
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With this backing, the Czech Republic continued to promote its new ap-
proach to Eastern Europe among the remaining EU countries and within EU 
institutions; it was quickly joined in this mission by Poland and Sweden, which 
tabled the more concrete Eastern Partnership proposal. Th ese eff orts took place 
along both formal (institutional) and informal (think -tank and NGO -based) 
tracks and persuaded the European Commission to publish its own “Com-
munication” document, which endorsed the proposal in late 2008 (Neuman 
2015: 120–128). During this lobbying stage, the Czech Republic sought out the 
support of countries outside the V4 framework, having realised that successful 
negotiation of the Eastern Partnership during its Council presidency would re-
quire a more all -encompassing coalition that went beyond the usual suspects.11 
What had started as a Czech/V4 eff ort, thus, became a broadly supported policy 
initiative, with the result that the Eastern Partnership was negotiated among 
the EU member states and the six Eastern European partner countries before 
fi nally being launched at a Prague summit on 7 May 2009.
Strengthening the European Union’s Energy Security
Ever since the Czech Republic achieved independence in 1993, the country has 
been wary of its reliance on energy supplies, particularly where Russian sources 
are concerned. As a result, it invested substantially in linking its oil pipeline 
system with the Western European one by building the Ingolstadt–Kralupy–Lit-
vínov (IKL) pipeline. Despite the IKL’s establishment in 1996, the Czech energy 
sector continues to be highly vulnerable to market distortions, especially in 
the case of its natural gas supplies, which all originate in post -Soviet countries.
Having said this, the Czech Republic’s reliance on – particularly – Russian 
natural gas is not unique when we consider the overall state of Central and 
Eastern European energy dependence; rather, the data shows that this is a fea-
ture common to all V4 countries. While it is true that the degree of dependence 
varies,12 all four Visegrád countries are thought to be in a vulnerable position. 
Th is vulnerability – combined with limited grid interconnectivity in the region 
and the perception of Russia as an unreliable energy partner (Neuman 2010) – 
11 “Interview C,” (Prague: Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, 2010)
12 According to a comprehensive comparative study conducted by the EU, the Czech Republic depended 
on imports for 102% of its natural gas consumption in 2002; the equivalent ﬁ gures for Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia in this period were 80.6%, 66.1% and 100%, respectively (while a ﬁ gure of 102% depend-
ency in the case of the Czech Republic seems rather odd at ﬁ rst sight, it is accurate as it also takes into 
account the required gas reserves that each country is supposed to have and that are calculated on 
top of the country’s gas consumption as such). This stands in sharp contrast with the result for the 
EU-15 states, which stood at just 47.8%. Moreover, this dependence of the V4 on natural gas supplies 
is exacerbated by the fact that almost all (and, in some cases, all) of these gas imports come from the 
post -Soviet space. For more information, see the data in “Energy, Transport, and Environment Indicators: 
Data 1992–2002,” available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3930297/5955046/KS -DK-05-
001-EN.PDF/08df871c -e648-4160-955e -ceaae2b27a24 (accessed 21 November 2016)
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led the Czech Republic to include the strengthening of EU energy security in 
its Council work programme. For Prague, the saliency of the issue increased 
with every additional disruption of energy supplies from the east, whether oil 
or gas was at stake; each delay was seen as a deliberate attempt by the Russian 
authorities to exert greater infl uence in the region. As the then Czech Deputy 
Prime Minister for European Aff airs Alexandr Vondra put it:
[the u]njust manipulation or interruption of energy supplies is as much a se-
curity threat as is military action. Post -soviet countries have been experiencing 
th[is] on a daily basis, as Russia’s appetite for using energy as a political tool 
is growing (Vondra 2007: 1).
During its Council presidency, Prague would focus on diversifying the European 
Union’s energy suppliers, routes and resources. At the same time, it called for 
the creation of an explicit common external energy plan to complement the 
European Union’s existing internal energy market.
If, as the discussion above suggests, the V4 substantially backed Czech eff orts 
to establish a dedicated Eastern European policy at EU level, then when it came 
to strengthening EU energy security, the V4’s support was overwhelming. Th is 
support was further cemented in the wake of the serious Russia–Ukraine crisis 
in January 2009, at which point between 71% (Slovakia) and 79% (Poland) of 
the population of the V4 states was greatly concerned with their country’s en-
ergy dependence on Russia (Nosko et al. 2010). As a result, alongside the 
unilateral promotion of its national preference in Brussels in the pre -Council 
presidency period, the Czech Republic framed its preference within the larger 
V4 context, thus making use of the other V4 partners in parallel with its own 
lobbying eff orts. Once again, Prague attempted to build a large coalition of EU 
member states that would support its quest, falling back upon both formal and 
informal lobbying mechanisms. When the Czechs set out to negotiate several 
specifi c policy changes in Brussels during the fi rst half of 2009, the Visegrád 
Group’s involvement became even more prominent. Th ese negotiations had 
two central goals: fi rst, they tried to foster explicit EU support for the (then 
planned) Nabucco pipeline and greater interconnectivity (in both cases backing 
from the EU budget was sought); and second, they aimed to lay the ground for 
a transfer of power from member state to EU level so as to establish a common 
external energy policy in the longer term. As one participant in the negotia-
tions testifi ed, the cooperation among Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw 
evolved to the point that their representatives closely coordinated positions 
before the meetings themselves. As such, they agreed on both the statements 
they would make and the order in which they would be presented to other 
member states, thus confi rming the true like -mindedness of the V4 countries 
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on energy questions.13 In this way, the V4 succeeded in persuading the remain-
ing Central and Eastern European countries and Baltic States to support the 
Czech Republic’s proposals. Even so, they fared considerably worse with the 
large EU member states, which did not want to jeopardise their long -standing 
bilateral relations with Moscow. Th e result was a political compromise: while the 
EU funded several specifi c projects intended to enhance grid interconnectivity 
among – predominantly – Central and Eastern European member states and it 
even released some (limited) funds for the Nabucco project, there was to be no 
common EU external energy policy.
Incorporating a Stronger Human Rights and External 
Democratisation Agenda into EU Foreign Policy
Driven by its own recent experience of transitioning from a socialist planned 
economy to a democratic liberal market, the Czech Republic took a clear in-
terest in supporting transition policies in both the near and far abroad. In 
Prague’s view, two inseparable elements lay at the core of any such transition: 
human rights and democracy.14 Over time, this understanding of political transi-
tion found institutional anchoring in the MFA’s Department for Human Rights 
and Transformation Policies. In early 2005, the Czech government formulated 
its fi rst concept of human rights and democracy promotion, introducing the 
term transition policy, which subsumed both policy dimensions. At the outset, 
Prague’s transition policy was built around several clearly demarcated thematic 
and territorial priorities. Th ose themes included the strengthening of civil soci-
ety in the target country, with a primary focus on furthering civic and political 
rights at the expense of other (e.g. economic, cultural and environmental) rights 
(Bílková and Matějková 2010a: 338). Th ese so -called fi rst generation rights 
were prioritised since they were seen as essential for establishing a democratic 
system of governance. Initially, the goal was to achieve these thematic goals 
in ten priority countries spanning the globe from Latin America (Cuba) to 
Europe (Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia 
and Ukraine), the Middle East (Iraq) and Asia (Burma) (Bílková and Matějková 
2010 b: 128). Over time, however, Prague came to realise that its transition ex-
perience was particularly useful in countries that were culturally, geographically, 
historically or otherwise similar, and the Czech transition policy concept was 
duly updated. Consequently, the Czech Republic turned its attention to Eastern 
Europe and the Western Balkans. Prague’s preferred method for bilaterally 
promoting human rights and democratisation abroad was cooperation with 
13 “Interview W,” (Brussels: Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union, 2010)
14 For a thorough analysis of the role that values and norms play in the Czech Republic’s foreign policy, 
please refer to Waisová (2012).
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local non -governmental institutions, which were thought to understand the 
realities on the ground. Empowering civil society was, thus, seen as essential 
for the achievement of lasting democratic development.
It should come as no surprise, then, that in the lead -up to its EU Council 
presidency, the Czech Republic set out to advance its particular understanding 
of human rights and democracy promotion at EU level. Th ese eff orts were all the 
more predictable given Prague’s general dissatisfaction with the Union’s mul-
tilateral measures, which it regarded as uncoordinated, inconsistent and inco-
herent.15 To this end, the Czech government launched its “European Consensus 
on Democracy,” an initiative that it would proceed to develop over the course of 
its presidency. Th is programme was modelled on the “European Consensus on 
Development,” a plan which the European Parliament, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union and the European Commission had adopted in December 2005 and 
which comprehensively outlined the common principles and values behind the 
EU’s development aims and eff orts and stated concrete measures to be taken.16 
Inspired by this blueprint, Prague attempted to solidify the Union’s stance on 
democracy promotion in several stages: it fi rst defi ned the constitutive elements 
of democracy and took steps to institutionalise democracy promotion activities 
within EU structures; it then set out an exhaustive list of policy instruments 
to be used to implement the plan. Alongside these eff orts to introduce a new 
consensus about human rights and democracy promotion among individual 
member states, Prague also took a key practical step: it attempted to ensure the 
existence of Civil Society Forum, a civil society counterpart to the multilateral 
governmental discussions about the emerging Eastern Partnership.
While, as we have seen, in the two previously discussed cases, the Visegrád 
Group proved itself a valuable partner both in advancing Czech interests at su-
pranational level and in negotiating specifi c policies, when it came to reforming 
the EU’s external human rights and democratisation policy, the V4 added far 
less value. Th is can be explained as a result of the highly politically sensitive 
nature of notions such as human rights and democracy. As such, while practi-
cally all of the EU member states agreed on the need to observe human rights 
and maintained that a democratic system was the best system for this purpose, 
the questions of which human rights and what type of democracy were far more 
controversial. Combined with a more fundamental debate over whether human 
rights and democracy can and indeed should be promoted abroad, these questions 
spurred much disagreement among the EU member states when faced with 
15 “Interview B,” (Prague: Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, 2010)
16 “The European Consensus on Development: Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and 
the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’,” available at 
http://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:42006X0224(01)&from=en (accessed 
14 November 2016)
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the Czech Republic’s position. Moreover, these discussions transcended the 
traditional V4/non -V4 dichotomy, forcing the Czech Republic to abandon its 
custom of fi rst approaching Visegrád Group for support. Instead, Prague set out 
to establish a more diverse coalition of like -minded countries. While the Czech 
representatives in Brussels made some headway promoting the country’s transi-
tion politics at EU level, no European Consensus on Democracy has been adopted 
until the present day, speaking directly to the controversial nature of the concept 
of democracy. With regard to the Civil Society Forum, the Czech Republic was 
somewhat more successful as this indeed became an inseparable element of the 
Eastern Partnership, albeit in a much weaker form than the Czech Republic 
initially proposed (Neuman 2015, pp. 236–246).
Conclusion
Th is contribution belongs to an ever -growing body of scholarship on the rotat-
ing EU Council presidency. More specifi cally, it has asked whether sub -regional 
integration projects such as the Visegrád Group can be understood as vehicles 
for pursuing one member’s national interests while it stands at the European 
Union’s helm. As such, this study has recognised Tallberg’s claim that while an 
EU member state must observe the rules related to (among other things) neutral-
ity during its Council presidency, both the period preceding that presidency and 
the presidency itself present the state with an opportunity to (at least partially) 
shape the EU’s agenda and – by extension – its policies. Keeping this in mind, 
I have hypothesised that relying on sub -regional integration partners may well 
enable the EU Council presidency to maintain a smokescreen of neutrality while 
simultaneously pursuing its national interests.
Th is hypothesis has also been tested using the case of the fi rst EU Council 
presidency of a Visegrád Group member, that is, the Czech Republic’s presidency 
in the fi rst semester of 2009. Assessing three specifi c policy areas – the reinven-
tion of the EU Eastern neighbourhood policy; the strengthening of EU energy 
security; and the incorporation of a stronger human rights and external de-
mocratisation agenda into EU foreign policy – this empirical study has revealed 
a mixed picture. While in the fi rst two instances, the Visegrád Group played an 
indispensable role in establishing and promoting the Czech Republic’s national 
preference, this was not the case with regard to the Czech Republic’s position on 
the European Union’s external human rights and democratisation policy. Th e 
same pattern also holds true for the negotiation of specifi c policies at EU level: 
while the V4 was the Czech Republic’s fi rst target in establishing a coalition 
to support the launch of the Eastern Partnership and the promotion of energy 
security through diversifi ed suppliers, routes and resources, the V4 did not 
exhibit much agency in the negotiation of the “Consensus on Democracy” and 
Civil Society Forum. Furthermore, these case studies also show that the Czech 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 8/8/17 4:05 PM
66 The Visegrád Group as a Vehicle for Promoting National Interests… Marek Neuman
Republic realised the V4’s potentially limited impact, and as such, took a multi-
-vectored approach to promoting its preferences at EU level. In other words, we 
can observe two parallel processes: on the one hand, the Czech Republic did 
indeed use the Visegrád Group as a vehicle for promoting its own interests in 
Brussels during its Council presidency in 2009; on the other, it did not give up 
on the option of fostering broader coalitions and nor did it shy away from pursu-
ing its preferences more overtly at times. As such, to a greater or lesser extent, 
Prague compromised the neutrality rule associated with the Council presidency.
Overall, then, this study has confi rmed the potential of the Visegrád Group 
to serve as a vehicle for furthering the national preferences of one member 
state while it holds the rotating EU Council presidency. Even so, whether or 
not this potential is fully realised will depend primarily on the degree to which 
the interests of the four Visegrád countries converge. Once again, this high-
lights the importance of treating the V4 not as a homogeneous group, but as 
an intergovernmental entity of four member states with – at times – diverging 
interests vis -à-vis further EU integration.
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